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Jurisdiction
This court has jurisdiction under Utah Code section 78A-3-102(3)(a).
Statement of the Issues and Standards of Review
In 1994, Lemuel Prion pleaded "guilty and mentally ill" to three felony charges.
On September 1, 1994, the district court (i) sentenced Mr. Prion to serve concurrent terms
of 5 years, 0 to 5 years, and 1 to 15 years, and (ii) ordered that Mr. Prion be committed to
the Utah State Hospital for up to 18 months of treatment for his mental illness. (Add. A.)
After nearly 8 months at the state hospital, Mr. Prion returned to the district court
for resentencing under Utah Code section 77-16a-202(b).1 On March 15, 1995, the
district court increased the sentence by ordering the three separate terms to run
consecutively, not concurrently. (Add. B.) Under the original sentence, Mr. Prion would
begin serving his 1 to 15 term immediately and his maximum sentence would be 15
years. But under the second sentence, Mr. Prion would not begin serving his 1 to 15 year
term until he had served his two 5-year terms, making his maximum term 25 years.
Upon learning of the significant difference between the sentences, Mr. Prion filed
a Rule 22(e) motion to vacate the second sentence on the ground that (i) the court lacked
statutory authority to increase his sentence and (ii) the second sentence violates state and
federal constitutional prohibitions on double jeopardy. The district court denied the
motion. The court reasoned that because section 77-16a-202(l)(b) provides authority to
resentence after treatment in the state hospital, the original sentence was not "final" for
double jeopardy purposes. (Add. C.)
1

"[T]he court shall sentence the offender to a term of imprisonment and order that he be
committed to the department for care and treatment for no more than 18 months, or until
he has reached maximum benefit, whichever occurs first. At the expiration of that time,
the court may recall the sentence and commitment, and resentence the offender." Utah
Code Ann. § 77-16a-202(l)(b) (1994).

In an unpublished per curiam decision, the court of appeals affirmed. The court
did not analyze the statutory scheme for the "guilty and mentally ill," of which section
77-16a-202(l)(b) is but a part, but held that Mr. Prion had no legitimate expectation of
finality in the original sentence because (i) section 77-16a-202(l)(b) permits resentencing
and (ii) the original sentencing order states that the court may amend the sentence. State
v. Prion, 2009 UT App 219. (Add. D.) In essence, the court of appeals held that as long
as a prisoner is told his sentence may be altered, jeopardy will never attach to a sentence.
Issue 1: Whether Utah Code section 77-16a-202(b) permits district courts to
increase a sentence after a prisoner has begun serving his sentence at the state hospital,
where he receives mandatory treatment for his mental illness.
Issue 2: Whether a district court's increasing a sentence under Utah Code section
77-16a-202(b) after a prisoner has been treated in the state hospital violates prohibitions
on double jeopardy, where the initial sentencing order is appealable as a final order and
the prisoner's time in the state hospital is credited toward serving the sentence.
Standard of Review: This court reviews a court of appeals' decision for
correctness. State v. Billsie, 2006 UT 13, f 6, 131 P.3d 239. This court reviews
interpretations of a statute for correctness. State v. Schofield, 2002 UT 132, ^f 6, 63 P.3d
667. And this court reviews the interpretation of constitutional provisions for
correctness. Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82,125, 100 P.3d 1177.
Preservation: The first issue was preserved at GR. 54-55. The second issue was
preserved at GR. 56-58. ("GR" refers to the green folder in the record.)
Determinative Provisions
All determinative provisions are at Addendum E.
2

Statement of the Case
I.

Nature of the Case
This case presents the question of whether section 77-16a-202(l)(b) provides

district courts the statutory authority to resentence a prisoner to a harsher sentence after
the prisoner initially has been sentenced and committed for treatment to a state hospital,
and, if so, whether constitutional prohibitions on double jeopardy prevent district courts
from exercising their statutory discretion in such a manner.
II.

Course of Proceedings and Statement of Facts
Because parts of the record have been destroyed and the district court has provided

two folders using the same record numbers for different documents, Mr. Prion will refer
to the record with "RR" for record cites in the red folder and "GR" for record cites in the
green folder. Mr. Prion does not cite the separate envelopes or preliminary hearing
transcript.
In November of 1993, the State charged Mr. Prion with three third-degree felonies
and two misdemeanors in case number 931800470. (GR. 12.) The felonies were
aggravated assault (third-degree felony); distribution of a controlled substance (thirddegree felony); and failure to pay or affix a drug tax stamp (third-degree felony).
(GR. 12.) The misdemeanors were escape from official custody (class B misdemeanor)
and possession of drug paraphernalia (class B misdemeanor). (GR. 12.)

"[T]he court shall sentence the offender to a term of imprisonment and order that he be
committed to the department for care and treatment for no more than 18 months, or until
he has reached maximum benefit, whichever occurs first. At the expiration of that time,
the court may recall the sentence and commitment, and resentence the offender.5'1 Utah
Code Ann. § 77-16a-202(l)(b) (1994).
3

While in jail, Mr. Prion attempted suicide by cutting himself. (GR. 9.) Based
upon the attempted suicide, the State filed three additional felony charges, including
felonies of the first, second, and third degrees in case number 941800068. (RR. 2.) The
additional felonies were (i) possession of a weapon in a correctional facility (seconddegree felony); (ii) damage to jails (third-degree felony); and (iii) habitual criminal
(first-degree felony). (RR. 2.)
On August 24, 1994, Mr. Prion pleaded "guilty and mentally ill" to three of the
charges in the two cases: (i) aggravated assault, (ii) dealer in possession without affixing
a drug tax stamp, and (iii) possession of a dangerous weapon in a correctional facility.
(RR. 50.) The remaining charges in each case were dismissed. (RR. 44.)
At the time of sentencing, a doctor testified that, given the effects of Mr. Prion's
medication, it would be inappropriate to place him with the Department of Corrections.
(GR. 4.) The district court agreed. On September 1, 1994, the district court entered a
"split sentence" under section 77-16a-202, sentencing Mr. Prion on the following terms:
0 to 5 years for the aggravated assault conviction, 0 to 5 years for the drug tax conviction,
and 1 to 15 years for the dangerous weapon conviction. (RR. 52-53.) Mr. Prion would
begin serving his sentence by being remanded to the Utah State Hospital for up to
18 months for treatment of his mental illness and then would serve his remaining
sentence in prison. (RR. 52-53.) Importantly, the court ordered that the three prison
terms run concurrently, so Mr. Prion's maximum sentence was 15 years. (RR. 52.) As
soon as Mr. Prion entered the state hospital, he began serving his sentence. The time in
the state hospital is credited against his sentence. Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202(4).

4

On March 14, 1995, after receiving 8 months of treatment in the state hospital,
Mr. Prion was brought back before the district court for resentencing under section
77-16a-202. (GR. 2.) During Mr. Prion's stay in the state hospital, he had received
unfavorable reviews. (GR. 2.) Based on those reviews, the district court made additional
findings of fact that Mr. Prion had potential for violent behavior and criminal conduct.
(GR. 2.) The district court also found that Mr. Prion's "attitude [was] not conducive to
supervision." (GR. 2.) Based upon these new findings of fact, the district court
effectively increased Mr. Prion's sentence by ordering that his terms run consecutively
rather than concurrently, which extended his maximum time to be served from 15 years
to 25 years. (RR. 61-62.)
Since his March 1995 resentencing, Mr. Prion has been detained at the Utah State
Prison in Draper. (RR. 61.) He filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence under Rule
22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, arguing that the resentencing violated
prohibitions on double jeopardy. (GR. 60-61.) On April 13, 2009, the district court
denied his motion. (GR. 15-16.) On August 13, 2009, the court of appeals affirmed on a
"sua sponte motion for summary disposition." Prion, 2009 UT App 219. In a
4-paragraph per curium opinion, it held that Utah Code section 77-16a-202(b)
contemplates a split sentence, and Mr. Prion therefore had no legitimate expectation of
finality in his first sentence. Prion, 2009 UT App 219, ^ 4.

5

Summary of the Argument
The district court exceeded its authority by increasing Mr. Prion's sentence under
Utah Code section 77-16a-202 after Mr. Prion had served 8 months on his sentence in the
state hospital. The district court also violated constitutional prohibitions on double
jeopardy by increasing Mr. Prion's sentence.
First, while section 77-16a-202 permits resentencing after treatment in the state
hospital, it does not permit increasing the time to be served. Under section 77-16a104(3), once a district court determines that a defendant is mentally ill, the court (i) "shall
impose any sentence that could be imposed under law upon a defendant who is not
mentally ill" and (ii) commit him to the state hospital while serving his sentence. Thus,
the original sentence does not reflect diminished culpability based upon mental illness;
rather, the statute addresses the treatment of a "guilty and mentally ill" offender. Under
section 77-16a-202, the prisoner receives "care and treatment" in the state hospital, but
the hospital does not gather evidence concerning culpability. While the statute provides
that the court may "resentence the offender," neither the legislative history nor the overall
statutory scheme suggests that courts may increase the original sentence. Instead,
resentencing presents an opportunity to determine whether (i) more time in the state
hospital is needed, (ii) probation is now appropriate, or (iii) prison is warranted.
Second, by increasing Mr. Prion's sentence, the district court violated double
jeopardy principles. Because Mr. Prion had begun serving his original sentence and the
order imposing that sentence was final for purposes of appeal, jeopardy attached and
Mr. Prion had a reasonable expectation of the finality of his original sentence. This court
should vacate the second sentence as violating prohibitions on double jeopardy.
6

Argument
The district court both exceeded its statutory authority, and violated constitutional
prohibitions on double jeopardy, when it increased Mr. Prion's sentence 8 months after
Mr. Prion had begun serving his sentence in the state hospital. For both reasons this court
should vacate the second sentence and reinstate Mr. Prion's original sentence.
I.

The District Court Misinterpreted the Statute as Granting It Authority to
Increase Mr. Prion's Sentence
Utah's law respecting the insanity defense is among the strictest in the nation.

Daniel J. Nusbaum, The Craziest Reform of Them All: A Critical Analysis of the
Constitutional Implications of "Abolishing" The Insanity Defense, Cornell L. Rev. 1509,
1524 (2002) (Utah law "effectively precludes almost all insane defendants from
exculpation on the basis of mental abnormality"). As a result, Utah treats a class of
defendants as criminally culpable who would be ineligible for criminal sanctions in other
jurisdictions. To deal with that class of defendants, the Legislature has enacted a detailed
scheme of interlocking statutory provisions specifically for those who are "guilty and
mentally ill." Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103 (1994).
Both the district court and the court of appeals analyzed the resentencing authority
granted to district courts under section 77-16a-202 without reference to the detailed
statutory scheme of which section 77-16a-202 is but a part. Under the statutory scheme
dealing with those who are "guilty and mentally ill," a district court may order a person
found guilty and mentally ill to the state hospital for treatment before they are sent to
prison, but may not, as the district court did here, increase a prisoner's sentence after the
prisoner has been treated in the state hospital.

7

A.

District Courts May Change the Location a Sentence Is Served in Light
of Treatment, But May Not Increase a Sentence

Under Utah law, if a defendant tenders a "guilty and mentally ill" plea, then the
district court holds a hearing to determine whether the defendant is mentally ill. Id. at
§ 77-16a-103(l).3 If the defendant is mentally ill, then the defendant is "sentenced in
accordance with Section 77-16a-104." Id at § 77-16a-103(4).4 Here, Mr. Prion entered a
plea of guilty and mentally ill, and the district court found Mr. Prion was mentally ill.
In sentencing under section 77-16a-104, the district court first "shall impose any
sentence that could be imposed under law upon a defendant who is not mentally ill" and
then choose from three options: (i) commitment to the state hospital under section 7716a-202; (ii) probation under section 77-16a-201; or (iii) prison. Id at § 77-16a-104(3).5
"Upon a plea of guilty and mentally ill being tendered by a defendant to any charge, the
court shall hold a hearing within a reasonable time to determine whether the defendant is
mentally ill." Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103(l) (1994).
4
"If the court concludes that the defendant is currently mentally ill his plea shall be
accepted and he shall be sentenced in accordance with Section 77-16a-104." Utah Code
Ann. §77-16a-103(4) (1994).
5
"If the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is currently
mentally ill, it shall impose any sentence that could be imposed under law upon a
defendant who is not mentally ill and who is convicted of the same offense, and:
(a) commit him to the department, in accordance with the provisions of Section 7716a-202, if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that: (i) because of his mental
illness the defendant poses an immediate physical danger to self or others,
including jeopardizing his own or others' safety, health, or welfare if placed in a
correctional or probation setting, or lacks the ability to provide the basic necessities
of life, such as food, clothing, and shelter, if placed on probation; and (ii) the
department is able to provide the defendant with treatment, care, custody, and
security that is adequate and appropriate to the defendant's conditions and needs. In
order to insure that the requirements of this subsection are met, the court shall
notify the executive director of the proposed placement and provide the department
with an opportunity to evaluate the defendant and make a recommendation to the
court regarding placement prior to commitment;
(b) order probation in accordance with Section 77-16a-201; or
(c) if the requirements of Subsections (a) and (b) are not met, place the defendant in
the custody of UDC."
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-104(3) (1994).
8

Here, the district court first sentenced Mr. Prion to serve concurrent terms of 5 years, 0 to
5 years, and 1 to 15 years, and then chose the first option, i.e., commitment to the state
hospital in accordance with section 77-16a-202.
Section 77-16a-202(l) states that, after imposing a sentence, the district court may
order commitment to the state hospital. Id. at § 77-16a-202(l).6 The district court has
two options in its commitment order. Under 77-16a-202(l)(a), the court may commit the
prisoner until the state hospital recommends transfer to the department of corrections,
where the prisoner will serve his remaining sentence. Or under 77-16a-202(l)(b), the
court can commit the prisoner to the hospital for no more than 18 months, after which
period the court may resentence. Id Here, the district court chose the second option.
While the prisoner is under the care of the state hospital, section 77-16a-203
requires the state hospital to submit reports on the prisoner's status to the court every six
months. Id at § 77-16a-202(3).7 Those reports describe "the offender's current mental
6

"In sentencing and committing a mentally ill offender to the department under
Subsection 77-16a-104(3)(a), the court shall:
(a) sentence the offender to a term of imprisonment and order that he be
committed to the department for care and treatment until transferred to
UDC in accordance with Sections 77-16a-203 and 77-16a-204; or
(b) sentence the offender to a term of imprisonment and order that he be
committed to the department for care and treatment for no more than 18
months, or until he has reached maximum benefit, whichever occurs first.
At the expiration of that time, the court may recall the sentence and
commitment, and resentence the offender. A commitment and retention of
jurisdiction under this subsection shall be specified in the sentencing order.
If that specification is not included in the sentencing order, the offender
shall be committed in accordance with Subsection (a)."
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202(l) (1994).
7
"When an offender is committed to the department under Subsection (l)(b), the
department shall provide the court with reports of the offender's mental health status
every six months. Those reports shall be prepared in accordance with the requirements of
Section 77-16a-203. Additionally, the court may appoint an independent examiner to
assess the mental health status of the offender." Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202(3) (1994).
9

condition, his progress since commitment, prognosis, and a recommendation regarding
whether the mentally ill offender should be transferred to [the department of corrections]
or remain [in the state hospital]." Id at § 77-16a-203(2).8 Notably, other than the
potential for recidivism, the reports do not evaluate culpability in light of the mental
illness.9 Instead, the state hospital determines whether the prisoner remains mentally ill
and continues to be a danger to self or others, and, if so, whether that danger requires
hospitalization, can be controlled while the prisoner is in the custody of the department of
corrections, or warrants probation. Id, at § 77-16a-203(3).10 In other words, the state
8

"At the conclusion of its evaluation, the review team described in Subsection (1) shall
make a report to the executive director regarding the offender's current mental condition,
his progress since commitment, prognosis, and a recommendation regarding whether the
mentally ill offender should be transferred to UDC or remain in the custody of the
department." Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-203(2) (1994).
9
The scope of the reports is confirmed by legislative history. Representative Lloyd
Frandsen, the sponsor, described the bill as providing an administrative process aimed at
"maximizing the treatment potential for mentally ill offenders." 1992 HB 418, House
Floor Debate, Feb. 25, 1992, available at http:/www.le.state.ut.us/asp/audio/
index.asp?House^H. (Add. F.) Several agencies, including the Department of Human
Services and the Department of Corrections, collaborated on the bill in an effort to
address the needs of this unique class of convicted persons. IdL Representative Frandsen
described the period of confinement as "treatment," which would be followed by a
possible modification of the prisoner's sentence. Id. Neither the debate nor the House
research file indicates that the treatment concerned assessing culpability for purpose of
extending a prison term.
10
"(a) The executive director shall notify the UDC medical administrator, and the
board's mental health adviser that a mentally ill offender is eligible for transfer to UDC if
the review team finds that the offender: (i) is no longer mentally ill; or (ii) is still
mentally ill and continues to be a danger to himself or others, but can be controlled if
adequate care, medication, and treatment are provided, and that he has reached maximum
benefit from the programs within the department.
(b) The administrator of the mental health facility where the offender is located shall
provide the UDC medical administrator with a copy of the reviewing staffs
recommendation and: (i) all available clinical facts; (ii) the diagnosis; (iii) the course of
treatment received at the mental health facility; (iv) the prognosis for remission of
symptoms; (v) the potential for recidivism; (vi) an estimation of the offender's
dangerousness, either to himself or others; and (vii) recommendations for future treatment."
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-203(3) (1994).
10

hospital determines the best location for the convicted person to serve a sentence, not the
length of that sentence.
When the period of initial confinement in the state hospital has expired, the district
court may "recall the sentence and commitment, and resentence the offender." Id. at
§ 77-16a-202(l)(b). Based upon information provided by the state hospital, under 7716a-104(3) the district court may resentence the prisoner as follows: (i) "probation in
accordance with Section 77-16a-201;" (ii) custody of the department of corrections; or
(iii) recommitment to the state hospital in accordance with section 77-16a-202(l), which
includes the option of commitment until such time as the state hospital determines prison
would be appropriate. Id. at § 77-16a-104(3).
If the mental illness has been mitigated (e.g., drugs), then probation may be
appropriate. If the illness is not treatable, then transfer to prison may be appropriate.
And if the prisoner could benefit from further treatment, then a longer stay in the state
hospital may be appropriate. Here, the state hospital and the district court both concluded
that Mr. Prion had received maximum benefit from the state hospital after 8 months.
Instead of simply ordering that Mr. Prion serve the remainder of his sentence in
prison, however, the district court made additional findings of fact concerning culpability
and increased Mr. Prion's maximum sentence from 15 years to 25 years. Under the
statute, the district court had no such authority, especially where the statute requires that
the original sentence be one "that could be imposed under law upon a defendant who is
not mentally ill." Id. at § 77-16a-104(3). The original sentence reflects criminal
culpability, so the State may not impose further punishment. If the prisoner remains
mentally ill and a danger to self or others after the service of a sentence, then the
11

administrator of the state hospital has the authority to initiate "civil proceedings of
involuntary commitment." Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202(4). The district court cannot
impose additional confinement, however, by increasing the previously imposed criminal
sanction, which, again, was one "that could be imposed under law upon a defendant who
is not mentally ill." Id. at § 77-16a-104(3). Therefore, when the district court here, in
responding to the state hospital's assessment, changed Mr. Prion's original sentence in
which his terms ran concurrently to a sentence in which those terms run consecutively,
* the court exceeded its statutory authority.
B.

This Court Should Interpret the Statute to Avoid Violations of the
Sixth Amendment

To the extent it is unclear whether district courts have authority to increase
punishment based upon additional factual findings after commitment to the state hospital,
this court should reject that interpretation because it would construe the statute to violate
both the Utah Constitution and the United States Constitution. When possible, courts
should construe statutes to be consistent with constitutional provisions. State v. Briggs,
2008 UT 83, Tf 47, 199 P.3d 935. Here, increasing a sentence based upon facts neither
found by a jury nor admitted by the defendant violates both state and federal
constitutional provisions.
Under the Sixth Amendment, "[a]ny fact (other than a prior conviction) which is
necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts
established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or
proved by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220,
244 (2005); see also Blakelv v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); Apprendi v. New
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Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). Similarly, under the Utah Constitution all punishmentenhancing facts must be established beyond a reasonable doubt either by a defendant's
plea or by a jury trial. State v. Lopes, 1999 UT 24, ^ 22, 980 P.2d 191. Otherwise, a
judge's independent fact finding for sentencing violates a defendant's due process and
jury trial rights. IdL; see also State v. Briggs, 2008 UT 83, ^ 47, 199 P.3d 935 (holding
that defendant's procedural due process rights were violated because he did not have
notice or an opportunity to contest his designation by the DOC as "currently dangerous").
By pleading guilty and mentally ill, Mr. Prion waived his right to a jury trial, but
admitted only facts sufficient to establish the offenses and not those facts later found by
the district court in resentencing based upon input from the state hospital. Based on the
facts before the district court at Mr. Prion's original sentencing, the court gave him three
concurrent sentences with a maximum of 15 years imprisonment. After Mr. Prion's
hospitalization, the court found that Mr. Prion had potential for "violent behavior and
criminal conduct" and increased the sentence terms to run consecutively to a maximum
of 25 years. (GR. 2.) The court's increasing (i.e., enhancing) Mr. Prion's sentence based
upon these facts violates state and federal constitutional provisions.
Even though Mr. Prion did not raise these particular constitutional concerns as an
independent ground for reversal, these concerns nonetheless may serve as an additional
reason to adopt Mr. Prion's interpretation of the statute because the district court's
interpretation, if adopted, would lead to constitutional concerns in the future. The
statutory scheme, its legislative history, and looming constitutional concerns all suggest
that this court should interpret section 77-16a-202(b) to preclude district courts from
increasing sentences when resentencing after treatment in the state hospital. This court
13

should vacate the second sentence and reinstate the original sentence, which was
grounded only on facts admitted by Mr. Prion.
II.

Mr. Prion's Second Sentence Violates Double Jeopardy Protections
Assuming the district court had authority to increase Mr. Prion's sentence, the

second sentence violates Mr. Prion's right to protection from double jeopardy. The
Double Jeopardy Clause provides that no person shall be "twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb." U.S. Const, amend. V; Utah Const, art. 1, § 12. "It is well established that the
Double Jeopardy Clause protects a defendant against multiple punishments, as well as
multiple prosecutions, for the same crime." State v. Maguire, 1999 UT App 45, f 7, 975
P.2d 476; see also State v. One Hundred Seventy-Five Thousand Eight Hundred Dollars,
942 P.2d 343, 349 (Utah 1997). By increasing Mr. Prion's sentence after he began
serving that sentence, the district court violated prohibitions on double jeopardy.
As explained in the following sections, Mr. Prion's resentencing violates double
jeopardy protections because: (i) jeopardy attached to the original sentence; (ii) Mr. Prion
had a legitimate expectation of finality in the original sentence; and (iii) the new sentence
increases a cumulative maximum term of imprisonment.
A.

Jeopardy Attached to Mr. Prion's First Sentence

The court of appeals held that jeopardy did not attach to the original sentence
because Mr. Prion had no "legitimate expectation of finality in his original sentence."
Sate v. Prion, 2009 UT App 219, Tf 3. The court of appeals' holding is based not only
upon a misinterpretation of the statute as permitting an increased sentence after treatment
at the state hospital, but also a mistaken view that Mr. Prion had no legitimate
expectation that his original sentence was final for purposes of double jeopardy. Viewed
14

under the appropriate test for finality, the original sentence was final for purposes of
double jeopardy.
Once a sentence is reduced to writing, signed by the court, and entered, it becomes
final. State v. Wright, 904 P.2d 1101, 1102 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). And once the
defendant begins serving that sentence, the court cannot recall it and impose another
punishment. Combs v. Turner, 483 P.2d 437, 401-02 (Utah 1971); North Carolina v.
Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969). In particular, a judge is powerless to increase a legal
sentence after the prisoner has begun to serve it. United States v. Busic, 639 F.2d 940,
946 (3d Cir. 1981). The "settled practice" is to allow resentencing and the imposition of
a harsher sentence only prior to commencement of service. IdL at 948.
"Commencement of service" includes court-ordered confinement in a mental
hospital. Wade R. Habeeb, Annotation, Right to credit for time spent in custody prior to
trial or sentence, 77 A.L.R.3d 182 (1977). Forced hospitalization is "the functional
equivalent of jail" because the prisoner is confined against his or her will. Maniccia v.
State, 931 So. 2d 1027 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006). As this court has recognized, "the
confinement of a person in an institution for mental health treatment is just as effective a
restraint on personal liberty as confinement in a prison and may, in some instances, be
even more trying or burdensome. It is therefore essential that the rights of one so
confined be treated with the same degree of respect as are the rights of persons deprived
of their liberty upon accusation or conviction of criminal conduct." In re Wahlquist, 585
P.2d 437, 439 (Utah 1978). Thus, time spent in a mental hospital counts as time spent in
prison when determining credit for time served. Habeeb at § 16[b].

15

Consistent with this position, under section 77-16a-202(4), once the time a
prisoner has spent confined in the state hospital equals the maximum term reflected in the
sentence imposed by the court, the prisoner can remain confined only pursuant to the
separate civil commitment statutes.11 In addition, under section 77-16a-205, a prisoner
can become eligible for, and be granted, parole while confined to the state hospital.
These provisions demonstrate that jeopardy attached when Mr. Prion began his
"commitment of service" in the state hospital.
A sentence also is final for double jeopardy purposes when it is final for purposes
of appeal and the time for the government to appeal the sentence has expired. As the
Tenth Circuit has explained, while a criminal sentence is still appealable by the
government the defendant can acquire no reasonable expectation of the finality of his
original sentence. United States v. Jackson, 903 F.2d 1313, 1315 (10th Cir. 1990).
However, once the time for appeal has expired, then an expectation of finality is
reasonable. Id. Here, the State could have appealed Mr. Prion's original sentence for 30
days after it was imposed, as this court has recognized similar "split" sentencing orders as
final for purposes of appeal. State v. Herrera, 1999 UT 64, % 16, 993 P.2d 854. Once the
State failed to appeal from Mr. Prion's original sentence, however, that sentence became
final for purposes of appeal and, therefore, final for purposes of double jeopardy.

Other jurisdictions also credit time confined in a mental hospital. People v. Cowsar,
115 Cal. Rptr. 160 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974) (court must credit time spent in mental hospital);
State v. La Badie, 534 P.2d 483, 485 (N.M. Ct. App. 1975) (same); People v. Pugh, 381
N.Y.S.2d 417, 418-19 (1976) (crediting mentally ill prisoner with eight years served in a
state hospital); Marsh v. Henderson, 424 S.W.2d 193, 196 (Tenn. 1968) (crediting
prisoner for time spent in a state mental institution because "imprisonment" includes
other "lawful place[s] of commitment and detention").
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The court of appeals erred in holding that jeopardy did not attach to the original
sentence because Mr. Prion began serving his sentence and the time for the State to
appeal that sentence expired.
B.

Mr. Prion Had a Legitimate Expectation of Finality in the Original
Sentence

Mr. Prion also had a legitimate expectation of finality in his original sentence.
This is important because an illegitimate expectation of finality does not trigger double
jeopardy protections. State v. Maguire, 1999 UT App 45, ^ 8, 975 P.2d 476; see also
Pasquarille v. United States, 130 F.3d 1220, 1222 (6th Cir. 1997). As the Tenth Circuit
has explained, "there is no intrusion upon the values protected by the Fifth Amendment's
double jeopardy clause by increasing the sentence of a criminal defendant if the
defendant's expectation of the finality of the original sentence was illegitimate." United
States v. Jackson, 903 F.2d 1313, 1315 (10th Cir. 1990). The circumstances under which
an expectation of finality is illegitimate include (i) an illegal sentence; (ii) a prisoner's
successful challenge to the conviction and sentence; and (iii) a sentence that undermines
the objectives of the criminal statute. None of these circumstances are present here.
First, defendant can acquire no legitimate expectation of finality if the sentence is
illegal. United States v. Jackson, 903 F.2d 1313, 1316 (10th Cir. 1990). Here,
Mr. Prion's original sentence was not illegal, as the district court merely ordered the
indeterminate terms to run concurrently, something left to the discretion of district courts
under Utah law. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (1994); Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-4 (1994).
Therefore, the first exception to finality is not present.
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Second, a prisoner cannot develop a "legitimate expectation of finality" where the
prisoner disturbs the original sentence with a successful appeal. Where the original
conviction is set aside, later resentencing may not violate principles of double jeopardy.
As the United States Supreme Court has explained, the power to retry a defendant is the
power, upon his reconviction, to impose whatever sentence may be authorized—even if it
is an increase in the previously vacated punishment. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S.
711, 721 (1969). Utah likewise recognizes that a defendant does not have a legitimate
expectation of finality where the defendant successfully challenges a conviction. State v.
Maguire, 1999 UT App 45,13, 975 P.2d 476. But the rationale for this doctrine "rests
ultimately upon the premise that the original conviction has, at the defendant's behest,
been wholly nullified and the slate wiped clean." Pearce, 395 U.S. at 721 (emphasis
added). Here, Mr. Prion did not appeal his sentence, let alone withdraw his guilty plea.
Therefore, Mr. Prion did not, "by his own hand, defeat[] his expectation of finality" in his
initial sentence. Maguire, 1999 UT App 45, f 11.
Third, trial courts are permitted to revise sentences to achieve the objectives of the
criminal statutes. Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. 376, 381 (1989) (quoting Missouri v.
Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366 (1983)). For example, when a sentence is imposed based on
multiple convictions on multiple crimes, and some of the convictions are then reversed,
the court may revise sentences on the remaining counts to achieve the purpose of the
criminal statutes. United States v. Busic, 639 F.2d 940 (3d Cir. 1981). Here, there is no
question that Mr. Prion's original sentence with concurrently running sentences did not
undermine the objectives of the criminal statutes at issue, especially since those statutes
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specifically authorize concurrent sentences. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (1994). This
should end the inquiry under the second exception to finality.
The court of appeals arguably grounded its rather truncated analysis under this
second "illegitimate expectation of finality" prong of double jeopardy law by stating that
the Legislature defeated any legitimate expectation of finality by resentencing under
section 77- 16a-202(b). Prion, 2009 UT App219, If 4. First, the court of appeals9
reasoning rests upon a misinterpretation of the statute, as demonstrated above. Second,
the relevant statutory objectives are the criminal statutes, not the "guilty and mentally ill"
statutory scheme. Third, if the broader objectives of the "guilty and mentally ill" statute
were relevant, rather than the statutes outlining the crimes to which Mr. Prion pleaded
guilty, the court of appeals' analysis still fails. If a legislature could render double
jeopardy principles inapplicable simply by declaring that a sentence can be increased at
any time—which, according to the court of appeal, would thereby undermine any
legitimate expectation to the contrary—then the legislature could nullify the
constitutional protections afforded by the double jeopardy clauses with a statute merely
stating that any sentence is subject to revision. This court should reject the court of
appeals' flawed and superficial double jeopardy analysis.
None of the three circumstances under which the law finds expectations of finality
"illegitimate" is present here. Therefore, Mr. Prion's original sentence was final and
jeopardy attached.
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C.

By Increasing Mr. Prion's Maximum Term of Imprisonment, the
District Court Violated His Double Jeopardy Protections

Because jeopardy attached, the district court violated prohibitions on double
jeopardy when it increased his maximum term of imprisonment. "An increase in the
prisoner's maximum term disturbs his legitimate expectation in the finality of his
sentence, thus violating the protection against multiple punishments guaranteed by the
double jeopardy clause." Stewart v. Scully, 925 F.2d 58, 58 (2d Cir. 1991). In Stewart,
the Second Circuit held that a prisoner has "an expectation of finality with regard to his
maximum term." Id. at 65. Therefore, the district court violated the prohibition on
double jeopardy when it increased the maximum term, even though the court revised the
sentence to comply with a requirement that the minimum sentence be a certain fraction of
the minimum sentence. Id. In other words, while certain aspects of a sentence may be
increased, the cumulative maximum sentence cannot exceed the original maximum term.
In Utah, even where a conviction has been vacated, the district court lacks
authority to impose a harsher sentence: "Where a conviction or sentence has been set
aside on direct review or on collateral attack, the court shall not impose a new sentence
for the same offense or for a different offense based on the same conduct which is more
severe than the prior sentence less the portion of the prior sentence previously satisfied."
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-405 (1994). The primary objective of 76-3-405 is to protect a
defendant's right to appeal by eliminating the chilling effect the threat of an increased
sentence after a successful appeal might have on the exercise of appellate rights. State v.
Samora, 2004 UT 79, ^f 15, 99 P. 3d 858. Similarly here, using any information gathered
during a "guilty and mentally ill" prisoner's stay at the state hospital to increase that
prisoner's punishment would chill the relationship between the prisoner and his
20

caretakers at the state hospital and would encourage the prisoner to be less than
forthcoming with those trying to provide treatment for the mental illness. For example, a
prisoner may be inclined not to reveal violent urges for fear that information will be used
to increase his sentence later. This public policy concern not only supports Mr. Prion's
interpretation of the statute, but bolsters his double jeopardy arguments.
As a result of the change from concurrent terms to consecutive terms, Mr. Prion's
maximum sentence was increased from 15 years to 25 years. He faces unavoidable
adverse consequences as a result of the change in his sentence. For example, his initial
parole hearing and first chance at release will be delayed by several years. The increase
in Mr. Prion's maximum sentence therefore violates prohibitions on double jeopardy.
Conclusion
This court should vacate Mr. Prion's second sentence and reinstate the original
sentence. The district court exceeded its statutory authority by increasing the original
sentence under section 77-16a-202(b). And even if the district court had statutory
authority to increase Mr. Prion's sentence, its exercise of that authority violated double
jeopardy provisions in both the Utah Constitution and the United State Constitution. This
court should reverse.
DATED this 11th day of August, 2010.
SNELL & WlLMER L.L.P.

Michael D/2immerman
Troy L. Booher
Michael J. Thomas
Attorneys for Petitioner Lemuel Prion
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ROLAND URESK #3307
Deputy Uintah County Attorney
Attorney for Plaintiff
152 East 100 North
Vernal, Utah 84078
(801) 781-5436
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF UINTAH, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

:
Plaintiff,

:

vs.

:

LEMUEL PRION,

:
Defendant.

ORDER

CASE NO.

931800470 FS
941800068 FS

:

This matter came on before the Court upon a hearing this the
19th day of August, 1994, the Honorable John R. Anderson
presiding.

The State being represented by Roland Uresk, Deputy

Uintah County Attorney.

The Defendant being personally present

and represented by Alan M. Williams.
The Defendant having pled guilty and mentally ill to the
charges of (1) Dangerous Weapon in Correctional Facility, a
Second Degree Felony; (2) Aggravated Assault, a Third Degree
Felony; (3) Dealer in Possession without Affixing Tax Stamp, a
Third Degree Felony.
The Court, having heard comments from both parties makes the
following findings:

COO 50

1.

That the Defendant poses an immediate physical

danger to himself or others, including jeopardizing his own or
others' safety, health, or welfare if placed in a correctional or
probation setting, or lacks the ability to provide the basic
necessities of life, such as food, clothing, and shelter, if
placed on probation.
2.

That until the Defendant's medication is regulated

he cannot be committed to the Department of Corrections.
Based upon the foregoing the Court finds by clear and
convincing evidence that the Defendant is currently mentally ill,
therefore;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1.

That the Defendant is committed to the Department

of Corrections for the following sentences: (a) Dangerous Weapon
in Correctional Facility, a Second Degree Felony, not less than
one (1) nor more than fifteen (15) years; (b) Aggravated Assault,
a Third Degree Felony, not more than five (5) years; (c) Dealer
in Possession without Affixing Tax Stamp, a Third Degree Felony,
not more than five (5) years.

Said sentences to run

concurrently.
2.

That the Defendant is committed to the Department

of Corrections for care and treatment for not more than eighteen
(18) months, or until he has reached maximum benefit whichever
2

GOO 1)2

occurs first.

Upon this determination the Defendant shall be

brought before this Court for reconsideration in his sentence.
3.

That the Department of Corrections shall file a

progress report with the Court, the County Attorney and the
Defendant's Attorney every six (6) months without fail.
4.

This Court retains jurisdiction in this matter to

alter or amend its order.
DATED this j $£

day of September, 1994.

JOHN'*R. ANDERSON
District Court Judge
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING\HAND DELIVERY

}

v&fMH VbAX*

I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage
prepaid, or hand delivered a true and correct copy of the
foregoing to Alan M. Williams, Attorney for Defendant, 365 West
50 North #W10, Vernal, Utah
Utah

84078; Uintah County Jail, Vernal,

84078.
DATED this ) &•

day of September, 1994.

MM^U-

G3G
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EIGHTH DISTRICT COURT - VERNAL
UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH
VS

JUDGMENT, SENTENCE
(COMMITMENT)

PRION, LEMUEL

CASE NO: 941800068
DOB: 04/27/62
TAPE:
COUNT:
DATE: 08/24/94

THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT BEING ADJUDGED GUILTY FOR THE
OFFENSE(S) AS FOLLOWS:
Charge: 76-8-311.3(C) POSS WEAP IN CORRECTIONAL FACILITY
Plea: Guilty
Find: Guilty Plea
Fine:
0.00
Susp:
0.00
Jail:
0
Susp:
0
ACS:

0

Charge: 76-8-418 INJ JAILS
Plea:
Find: Dismissed
Fine:
0.00
Susp:
0.00.
Jail:
0
Susp:
0

ACS:

0

Charge: 76-8-1001 HABITUAL CRIM
Plea:
Find: Dismissed
Fine:
0.00
Susp:
0.00
Jail:
0
Susp:
0

ACS:

0

GOB

3D

CASE NO: 941800068

PRION, LEMUEL

PAGE 2

DOCKET INFORMATION;
Chrg: HABITUAL CRIM
Plea:
Find: Dismissed
COURT FINDS BASED DOCTOR'S TESTIMONY ABOUT EFFECT OF MEDICINE,
IT WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE TO PLACE DEF WITH DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS
RIGHT NOW. COURT FINDS DEF IS GUILTY BUT MENTALLY ILL, HAVING
MET THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE STATE. COURT SENTENCES DEF TO TO
1-15 YEARS AT UTAH STATE PRISON FOR DANGEROUS WEAPON IN
CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION, F2. COURT ORDERS DEF COMMITTED TO THE
CARE OF DEPT. OF HUMAN SERVICES FOR NO MORE THAN 18 MONTHS.
COURT ORDERS JURISDICTION BY THIS COURT BE SPECIFIC AND WILL
REVIEW AND RESENTENCE DEF IN 18 MONTHS, OR SOONER. COURT WILL
RECEIVE REPORTS OF DEF'S PROGRESS.
DATED THIS
^7
DAY OF AUGUST, 1994.
Sentence:
'
Chrg: POSS WEAP-CORREC
Plea: Guilty
Find: Guilty Plea
Prison:
1 to 15 YEARS
Suspended:
0
Chrg: INJ JAILS
Plea:
Find: Dismissed

(Jr DISTRICT"COURT JUDGE/COMMISSIONER
NOTE: APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS
OF ENTRY OF THIS JUDGMENT.
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KENNETH R. WALLENTINE #581?
Chief Deputy Uintah County Attorney
Attorney for Plaintiff
152 East 100 North
Vernal, Utah 84 078
(801) 781-5435
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF UINTAH, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
ORDER AND COMMITMENT
vs.

:

LEMUEL PRION,

:
Defendant.

CASE NO.

941800068 FS

:

THIS MATTER came before the Court for sentencing on the 14th
»

day of March, 1995.
Williams.

Defendant appeared with nis attorney, Alan M.

The State was represented by Kenneth R. Wallentine,

Chief Deputy Uintan County Attorney.

Defendant having plead guilty

to the aforementioned charges, the Court finds Defendant presents
a serious threat of violent behavior, with repetitive instances of
criminal conduct, and has an attitude not conducive to probation;
therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1.

That Defendant be committed to the Utah State Prison for

a term of not less than ONE (1) YEAR nor more than FIFTEEN (15)
YEARS upon the offense

of Dangerous Weapon

Facility, a Second Degree Felony.

j £f

Correctional

Said sentence to be served

consecutively with Case No. 941800470.
w j J

in a

Defendant is remanded to

the cusrody of rhe Uintah County Sheriff to be delivered by him to
rhe Warden of rhe Utah Stare Prison.
2*

It

is the

Court's recommendation

that

the Defendant:

continue on his prescribed medication.
dav of March, 1995

DATED t m s

^yJuHN R.AND EPS ON
District Court Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify rhat I mailed, posrage prepaid,
delivered

a true copy

of rhe foregoing

JuJgiue.it and

or hand
Crier

of

Commitment to Alan K. Williams, Attorney for Defendant, 365 West 50
North #W10, Vernal, UT 84 078; Department of Corrections, 152 East
100 North, Vernal, Utah 84078; Uintah County Jail, Vernal, Utah
84078.
DA.TED this

- ^?

day of March, 1995.

V ^/ J

FILED
DISTRICT COURT
UINTAH COUNTY UTAH

MAR 2 0 1995
SHANA VWlfafcCK, CLERK

STATE OF UTAH
VS
PRION, LEMUEL

EIGHTH DISTRICT COURT - VERNAL
^
Ll^__^ DEPUTY
UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
0
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE
(COMMITMENT)
CASE NO: 941800068
DOB: 04/27/62
TAPE:
COUNT:
DATE: 03/14/95

THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT BEING ADJUDGED GUILTY FOR THE
OFFENSE(S) AS FOLLOWS:
Charge: 76-8-311.3(C) POSS WEAP IN CORRECTIONAL FACILITY
Plea: Guilty
Find: Guilty Plea
Fine:
0.00
Susp:
0.00
Jail:
0
Susp:
0
ACS:

0

Charge: 76-8-418 INJ JAILS
Plea:
Find: Dismissed
Fine:
0.00
Susp:
0.00
Jail:
0
Susp:
0

ACS:

0

Charge: 76-8-1001 HABITUAL CRIM
Plea:
Find: Dismissed
Fine:
0.00
Susp:
0.00
Jail:
0
Susp:
0

ACS:

0

GOO i0

PRION, LEMUEL

CASE NO: 941800068

PAGE 2

DOCKET INFORMATION:
Chrg: HABITUAL CRIM
Plea:
Find: Dismissed
COURT FINDS BASED DOCTOR'S TESTIMONY ABOUT EFFECT OF MEDICINE,
IT WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE TO PLACE DEF WITH DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS
RIGHT NOW. COURT FINDS DEF IS GUILTY BUT MENTALLY ILL, HAVING
MET THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE STATE. COURT SENTENCES DEF TO TO
1-15 YEARS AT UTAH STATE PRISON FOR DANGEROUS WEAPON IN
CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION, F2. COURT ORDERS DEF COMMITTED TO THE
CARE OF DEPT. OF HUMAN SERVICES FOR NO MORE THAN 18 MONTHS.
COURT ORDERS JURISDICTION BY THIS COURT BE SPECIFIC AND WILL
REVIEW AND RESENTENCE DEF IN 18 MONTHS, OR SOONER. COURT WILL
RECEIVE REPORTS OF DEF'S PROGRESS.
DATED THIS
DAY OF AUGUST, 1994.
BY THE COURT:
JOHN R. ANDERSON, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
Sentence:
Chrg: POSS WEAP-CORREC
Plea: Guilty
Find: Guilty Plea
Prison:
1 to 15 YEARS
Suspended:
0
Chrg: INJ JAILS
Plea:
Find: Dismissed
Sentence:
Prison:
1 to 15 YEARS
Suspended:
0
THE COURT RESENTENCES DEF TO NOT LESS THAN 1 OR MORE THAN 15
YEARS IN UTAH STATE PRISON FOR POSSESSION OF WEAPON IN
CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, F2, IN THIS CASE; AND ALSO IN CASE
941800470, THE COURT SENTENCES DEF TO TWO TERMS NOT TO EXCEED
5 YEARS FOR AGG. ASLT, F3, AND FAILURE TO AFFIX DRUG TAX STAMP,
F3. SENTENCES ARE TO RUN CONSECUTIVELY. DEF IS TO REMAIN ON
MEDICATION, AND MEDICATION IS TO BE MONITORED. COURT WILL STAY
EXECUTION OF SENTENCE UNTIL TUESDAY, MARCH 21, 1995, SO DEF
CAN VISIT WITH MOTHER BEFORE HE IS REMANDED TO THE CUSTODY OF
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS.
DATED THIS-/72
DAY OF MARCH, 1995.

^DISTRICT COURT JUDGE/COMMISSIONER
NOTE: APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS
OF ENTRY OF THIS JUDGMENT.
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COURTS
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT C
O U R T ^ %>n
^ */,
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF U T A H \ / t
State of Utah,

tyfc

RULING AND ORDER ON
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
CORRECT ILLEGAL SENTENCE

Plaintiff,
vs.
Lemuel Prion,

Case No. 941800068

Defendant.

Judge JOHN R. ANDERSON

This matter is before the Court on the Defendant's Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence.
Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure allows a court to correct an illegal
sentence at any time.
On September 1, 1994, this Court found that the Defendant was mentally ill. The Court
imposed sentences for the three crimes the Defendant committed and ordered the sentences to
run concurrently. The Court ordered the Defendant to be committed to the Department of
Corrections for care and treatment for no more than 18 months, or until the Defendant reached
maximum benefit. The Court ordered that after that period of care and treatment, the Defendant
would be brought before the Court for reconsideration of his sentence.
On March 15, 1995, the Defendant was brought before the Court for sentencing. The
Court imposed sentences for the three crimes the Defendant committed and ordered the sentences
to run consecutively.
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The Defendant argues that the sentence imposed was illegal because it violated his right
to be free of double jeopardy. Specifically, the Defendant argues that when he was sentenced
after the 18 month period in the State Hospital, he received a longer sentence.
The Double Jeopardy Clause states "[n]or shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb

" U.S. Const, amend V. "[T]he Double

Jeopardy Clause protects defendants against multiple punishments, as well as multiple
prosecutions, for the same crime." State v. Maguire, 975 P.2d 476,478 (Utah App. 1999).
However, the Double Jeopardy Clause only protects against re-sentencing when the defendant
reasonably believes the original sentence is final. Id. at 479.
Utah Code Ann. §77-16a-202(b) allows a court to recall the sentence and commitment,
and re-sentence the offender after the offender has been in the State Hospital for the specified
period of time. Here, the Defendant had no reasonable expectation that the September 1, 1994,
sentence wasfinalbecause the Court specifically stated that the Defendant's sentence would be
reconsidered after the 18 month period. Therefore, the Defendant's sentence did not violate the
Double Jeopardy Clause and was not illegal.
The Defendant's Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence is denied.
Dated this l<> day of

QjCVuJ

2009.

JOHN R. ANDERSON, District Court Judge
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PER CURIAM:
Lemuel Prion appeals the district court's order denying his
motion to correct an illegal sentence. This matter is before us
on a sua sponte motion for summary disposition. We affirm.
Utah Code section 77-l6a-202(b) permits the district court
to sentence an offender to a term of imprisonment and order that
the offender first be committed to the Department of Human
Services for treatment until the offender's condition has been
stabilized, but in no case shall the offender be committed for
more than eighteen months. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202(b)
(2008). At the expiration of an offender's treatment, "the court
may recall the sentence and commitment, and resentence the
offender." Id. A commitment and retention of the district
court's jurisdiction under Utah Code section 77-16a-202(b) "shall
be specified in the sentencing order." Id.
Prion asserts that the district court violated his
constitutional right to be free from double jeopardy when it
recalled his sentence, pursuant to section 77-16a-202(b), and
determined to run the sentences consecutively rather than
concurrently. This court previously determined that the double
jeopardy clause "only proscribes resentencing where the defendant

has developed a legitimate expectation of the finality in his
original sentence." State v. Maguire, 1999 UT App 45, ^ 8, 975
P.2d 476. Thus, where there is no legitimate expectation of
finality in the first proceeding, there can be no violation of
double jeopardy protections. See id.
As required by Utah Code section 77-16a-202(b), the
September 1, 1994 order provided that the district court retained
jurisdiction to alter or amend its originally contemplated
sentence. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202(b). Additionally, the
September 1, 1994 order expressly indicated that Prion's sentence
would be reconsidered once he was released from his mental health
treatment. Thus, we cannot say that Prion could legitimately
expect that the September 1, 1994 order constituted his final
sentence. Accordingly, the district court did not violate
Prion f s constitutional right to be free from double jeopardy.1
Affirmed.

Pamela T. Greenwood,
Presiding Judge

Russell W. Bench, Judge

1. Prion raises additional issues on appeal. We determine that
those issues lack merit and do not address them.
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*** ARCHIVE MATERIAL ***
*** THIS SECTION CURRENT THROUGH THE 1994 SUPPLEMENT ***
*** (1994 REGULAR SESSION) ***
TITLE 76. CRIMINAL CODE
CHAPTER 3. PUNISHMENTS
PART 4. LIMITATIONS AND SPECIAL PROVISIONS ON SENTENCES
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-405 (1994)
§ 76-3-405. Limitation on sentence where conviction or prior sentence set aside

Where a conviction or sentence has been set aside on direct review or on collateral attack, the court shall
not impose a new sentence for the same offense or for a different offense based on the same conduct which is
more severe than the prior sentence less the portion of the prior sentence previously satisfied.
HISTORY: C. 1953, 76-3-405, enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-3-405.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
In general.
Appeal to district court from justice court.
Attorney's misstatement of law to defendant.
Finality of sentence.
Purpose of section.
Second sentence less severe.
Second sentence more severe.
Cited.
IN GENERAL.
This section's prohibition against a more severe second sentence requires that the second sentence cannot
exceed the first sentence in appearance or effect, in the number of its elements or in their magnitude; therefore, concerning the second sentence, no new element of sentence can be added, no element can be augmented in magnitude, and there can be no tradeoff by increasing one element of a sentence by reference to a
decrease in another element. State v. Sorensen, 639 P.2d 179 (Utah 1981).
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APPEAL TO DISTRICT COURT FROM JUSTICE COURT.
At a trial de novo in district court on appeal from a conviction in a justice court, district court could not
sentence defendant upon conviction to a more severe sentence than imposed by justice court. Wisden v. District Court, 694 P.2d 605 (Utah 1984), affd, 737 P.2d 981 (Utah 1987).
ATTORNEY'S MISSTATEMENT OF LAW TO DEFENDANT.
Defendant's allegation that he failed to appeal his conviction due to his attorney's advice that he stood a
substantial chance of receiving a much harsher sentence upon a retrial, such advice being a misstatement of
the law as provided by this section, entitled defendant to challenge his conviction by a petition for writ of
habeas corpus where defendant also alleged that he was required to appear at trial in prison clothing, which
allegation if true would constitute a violation of his constitutional due process rights. Chess v. Smith, 617
P.2d 341 (Utah 1980).
FINALITY OF SENTENCE.
Concurrent sentences orally ordered by judge, but not signed in order to continue sentencing hearing for
reconsideration of sentence, were not "set aside" on direct review or collateral attack within the meaning of
this section. Therefore, the court's later imposition of consecutive sentences did not violate this section. State
v. Curry, 814 P.2d 1150 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
PURPOSE OF SECTION.
The purpose behind this section is to prevent the chilling effect on the constitutional right to appeal which
the possibility of a harsher sentence would have on a defendant who might be able to demonstrate reversible
error in his conviction. State v. Babbel, 813 P.2d 86 (Utah 1991), cert, denied, U.S. , 112 S. Ct. 883, 116
L.Ed. 2d 787 (1992).
This section was intended to protect the right of a criminal defendant to appeal, not to prevent the correction of a sentence unlawfully imposed. State v. Babbel, 813 P.2d 86 (Utah 1991), cert, denied, U.S. , 112
S. Ct. 883, 116 L. Ed. 2d 787 (1992).
The legislative intent behind this section is to protect an accused's constitutional right to appeal without
having to face the possibility of a harsher sentence. State v. Mitchell, 824 P.2d 469 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
SECOND SENTENCE LESS SEVERE.
Defendant's second sentence of one to fifteen years, plus one to five years and a $10,000 fine was less severe when viewed in toto than his first sentence of life imprisonment. This was so even though the first sentence did not include components analogous to aspects of the second sentence. State v. Mitchell, 824 P.2d
469 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
SECOND SENTENCE MORE SEVERE.
Defendant's second sentence, imposed after a successful appeal of his first conviction and a second conviction on retrial, was more severe than the first sentence and was therefore prohibited by this section where
following his first conviction, defendant was sentenced to 1 to 15 years in the penitentiary, but execution of
that sentence was stayed and he was placed on two years' probation on the condition that he serve six months
in the county jail and pay full restitution and, after his second conviction, defendant was sentenced to 1 to 15
years in the penitentiary without requiring restitution, but with service of sentence to begin without delay.
State v. Sorensen, 639 P.2d 179 (Utah 1981).
CITED in Dunn v. Cook, 791 P.2d 873 (Utah 1990).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. —Propriety of increased punishment on new trial for same offense, 12 A.L.R.3d 978.

Page 3
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-405

KEY NUMBERS. -Criminal Law KEY 260(13).
USER NOTE: For more generally applicable notes, see notes under the first section of this article, part, chapter, subtitle, or title.
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TITLE 77. UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CHAPTER 16a. COMMITMENT AND TREATMENT OF MENTALLY ILL PERSONS
PART 1. PLEA AND VERDICT OF GUILTY AND MENTALLY ILL
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-101 (1994)
§77-16a-101. Definitions

As used in this chapter:
(1) "Board" means the Board of Pardons and Parole established under Section 77-27-2.
(2) "Department" means the Department of Human Services.
(3) "Executive director" means the executive director of the Department of Human Services.
(4) "Mental health facility" means the Utah State Hospital or other facility that provides mental health
services under contract with the division, a local mental health authority, or organization that contracts with a
local mental health authority.
(5) "Mentally ill" means the same as that term is defined in Section 76-2-305.
(6) "Mentally ill offender" means an individual who has been adjudicated guilty and mentally ill, including an individual who is mentally retarded.
(7) "Mentally retarded" means the same as the term "mental retardation", defined in Section 62A-5101.
(8) "UDC" means the Department of Corrections.
HISTORY: C. 1953, 77-16a-101, enacted by L. 1992, ch. 171, § 1; 1994, ch. 13, § 23.
NOTES: AMENDMENT NOTES. -The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994, substituted "Board of
Pardons and Parole" for "Board of Pardons" in Subsection (1).
COMPILER'S NOTES. -Rule 21.5, U.R.Crim.P., deals with pleas claiming mental illness or insanity. For
notes from cases on that subject, see the Court Rules volume.
EFFECTIVE DATES. -Laws 1992, ch. 171, § 18 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992.
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NOTES APPLICABLE TO ENTIRE TITLE
REPEALS AND REENACTMENTS. -Title 77, Chapters 1 to 66, the Code of Criminal Procedure, was repealed by Laws 1980, ch. 15, § 1, effective July 1, 1980, and present Utah Code of Criminal Procedure,
Chapters 1 to 34, was enacted in its place by § 2 of the same act. Section 3 of Laws 1980, ch. 15 provided:
"Nothing in this act shall be construed to repeal any particular section of Title 77, if that section is the subject
of an amendment or new legislation enacted by this budget session of the 43 rd Utah legislature and which
becomes law. It is the intent of the legislature that the corresponding sections of this act shall be construed
with such amended sections so as to give effect to the amendment as if it were made a part of this act."
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TITLE 77. UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CHAPTER 16a. COMMITMENT AND TREATMENT OF MENTALLY ILL PERSONS
PART 1. PLEA AND VERDICT OF GUILTY AND MENTALLY ILL
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-102 (1994)
§ 77-16a-102. Jury instructions

If a defendant asserts a defense of not guilty by reason of insanity, the court shall instruct the jury that it
may find the defendant:
(1) guilty;
(2) not guilty;
(3) not guilty by reason of insanity;
(4) guilty and mentally ill;
(5) guilty of a lesser offense;
(6) guilty of a lesser offense and mentally ill; or
(7) guilty of a lesser offense due to mental illness, but not a mental illness that warrants full exoneration.
HISTORY: C. 1953, 77-16a-102, enacted by L. 1992, ch. 171, § 2.
NOTES: EFFECTIVE DATES. -Laws 1992, ch. 171, § 18 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992.
USER NOTE: For more generally applicable notes, see notes under the first section of this article, part, chapter, subtitle, or title.
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TITLE 77. UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CHAPTER 16a. COMMITMENT AND TREATMENT OF MENTALLY ILL PERSONS
PART 1. PLEA AND VERDICT OF GUILTY AND MENTALLY ILL
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103 (1994)

§ 77-16a-103. Plea of guilty and mentally ill
(1) Upon a plea of guilty and mentally ill being tendered by a defendant to any charge, the court shall hold
a hearing within a reasonable time to determine whether the defendant is mentally ill.
(2) The court may order the department to examine the defendant, and may receive the testimony of any
public or private expert witness offered by the defendant or the prosecutor. The defendant may be placed in
the Utah State Hospital for that examination only upon approval by the executive director.
(3) (a) A defendant who tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill shall be examined first by the trial
judge, in compliance with the standards for taking pleas of guilty. The defendant shall be advised that a plea
of guilty and mentally ill is a plea of guilty and not a contingent plea.
(b) If the defendant is later found not to be mentally ill, that plea remains a valid plea of guilty, and the
defendant shall be sentenced as any other offender.
(4) If the court concludes that the defendant is currently mentally ill his plea shall be accepted and he
shall be sentenced in accordance with Section 77-16a-104.
(5) (a) When the offense is a state offense, expenses of examination, observation, and treatment for the
defendant shall be paid by the department.
(b) Travel expenses shall be paid by the county where prosecution is commenced.
(c) Expenses of examination for defendants charged with violation of a municipal or county ordinance
shall be paid by the municipality or county that commenced the prosecution.
HISTORY: C. 1953, 77-16a-103, enacted by L. 1992, ch. 171, § 3.
NOTES: EFFECTIVE DATES. -Laws 1992, ch. 171, § 18 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992.
USER NOTE: For more generally applicable notes, see notes under the first section of this article, part, chapter, subtitle, or title.

Page 5

£

LexisNexis*
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
Copyright (c) 1953-1994 by The Michie Company
All rights reserved.
*** ARCHIVE MATERIAL ***
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TITLE 77. UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CHAPTER 16a. COMMITMENT AND TREATMENT OF MENTALLY ILL PERSONS
PART 1. PLEA AND VERDICT OF GUILTY AND MENTALLY ILL
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-104 (1994)

§ 77-16a-104. Verdict of guilty and mentally ill — Hearing to determine present mental state

(1) Upon a verdict of guilty and mentally ill for the offense charged, or any lesser offense, the court shall
conduct a hearing to determine the defendant's present mental state.
(2) The court may order the department to examine the defendant to determine his mental condition, and
may receive the evidence of any public or private expert witness offered by the defendant or the prosecutor.
The defendant may be placed in the Utah State Hospital for that examination only upon approval of the executive director.
(3) If the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is currently mentally ill, it shall
impose any sentence that could be imposed under law upon a defendant who is not mentally ill and who is
convicted of the same offense, and:
(a) commit him to the department, in accordance with the provisions of Section 77-16a-202, if it finds
by clear and convincing evidence that:
(i) because of his mental illness the defendant poses an immediate physical danger to self or others,
including jeopardizing his own or others' safety, health, or welfare if placed in a correctional or probation
setting, or lacks the ability to provide the basic necessities of life, such as food, clothing, and shelter, if
placed on probation; and
(ii) the department is able to provide the defendant with treatment, care, custody, and security that is
adequate and appropriate to the defendant's conditions and needs. In order to insure that the requirements of
this subsection are met, the court shall notify the executive director of the proposed placement and provide
the department with an opportunity to evaluate the defendant and make a recommendation to the court regarding placement prior to commitment;
(b) order probation in accordance with Section 77-16a-201; or
(c) if the requirements of Subsections (a) and (b) are not met, place the defendant in the custody of
UDC.
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(4) If the court finds that the defendant is not currently mentally ill, it shall sentence the defendant as it
would any other defendant.
(5) Expenses for examinations ordered under this section shall be paid in accordance with Subsection 7616a-103(5).
HISTORY: C. 1953, 77-16a-104, enacted by L. 1992, ch. 171, § 4.
NOTES: EFFECTIVE DATES. -Laws 1992, ch. 171, § 18 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992.
USER NOTE: For more generally applicable notes, see notes under the first section of this article, part, chapter, subtitle, or title.

Page 7

• ' LexisNexis'
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
Copyright (c) 1953-1994 by The Michie Company
All rights reserved.
*** ARCHIVE MATERIAL ***
*** THIS SECTION CURRENT THROUGH THE 1994 SUPPLEMENT ***
*** (1994 REGULAR SESSION) ***
TITLE 77. UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CHAPTER 16a. COMMITMENT AND TREATMENT OF MENTALLY ILL PERSONS
PART 2. DISPOSITION OF DEFENDANTS FOUND GUILTY AND MENTALLY ILL
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-201 (1994)
§ 77-16a-201. Guilty and mentally ill — Probation

(1) (a) When the court proposes to place on probation a defendant who has pled or is found guilty and mentally ill, it shall request UDC to provide a presentence investigation report regarding whether probation is
appropriate for that defendant and, if so, recommending a specific treatment program. If the defendant is
placed on probation, that treatment program shall be made a condition of probation, and the defendant shall
remain under the jurisdiction of the sentencing court.
(b) The court may not place a mentally ill offender who has been convicted of a capital offense on probation.
(2) The period of probation may be for no less than five years, or until the expiration of the defendant's
sentence, whichever occurs first. Probation may not be subsequently reduced by the sentencing court without
consideration of an updated report on the mental health status of the defendant.
i
(3) (a) Treatment ordered by the court under this section may be provided by or under contract with the
department, a mental health facility, a local mental health authority, or, with the approval of the sentencing
court, any other public or private mental health provider.
(b) The entity providing treatment under this section shall file a report with the defendant's probation
officer at least every six months during the term of probation.
(c) Any request for termination of probation regarding a defendant who is receiving treatment under
this section shall include a current mental health report prepared by the treatment provider.
(4) Failure to continue treatment or any other condition of probation, except by agreement with the entity
providing treatment and the sentencing court, is a basis for initiating probation violation hearings.
(5) The court may not release a mentally ill offender into the community, as a part of probation, if it finds
by clear and convincing evidence that he:
(a) poses an immediate physical danger to himself or others, including jeopardizing his own or others'
safety, health, or welfare if released into the community; or
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(b) lacks the ability to provide the basic necessities of life, such as food, clothing, and shelter, if released into the community.
(6) A mentally ill offender who is not eligible for release into the community under the provisions of
Subsection (5) may be placed by the court, on probation, in an appropriate mental health facility.
HISTORY: C. 1953, 77-16a-201, enacted by L. 1992, ch. 171, § 5.
NOTES: EFFECTIVE DATES. -Laws 1992, ch. 171, § 18 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992.
NOTES APPLICABLE TO ENTIRE TITLE
REPEALS AND REENACTMENTS. -Title 77, Chapters 1 to 66, the Code of Criminal Procedure, was repealed by Laws 1980, ch. 15, § 1, effective July 1, 1980, and present Utah Code of Criminal Procedure,
Chapters 1 to 34, was enacted in its place by § 2 of the same act. Section 3 of Laws 1980, ch. 15 provided:
"Nothing in this act shall be construed to repeal any particular section of Title 77, if that section is the subject
of an amendment or new legislation enacted by this budget session of the 43rd Utah legislature and which
becomes law. It is the intent of the legislature that the corresponding sections of this act shall be construed
with such amended sections so as to give effect to the amendment as if it were made a part of this act."
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TITLE 77. UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CHAPTER 16a. COMMITMENT AND TREATMENT OF MENTALLY ILL PERSONS
PART 2. DISPOSITION OF DEFENDANTS FOUND GUILTY AND MENTALLY ILL
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202 (1994)
§ 77-16a-202. Guilty and mentally ill — Commitment to department
(1) In sentencing and committing a mentally ill offender to the department under Subsection 77-16a104(3)(a), the court shall:
(a) sentence the offender to a term of imprisonment and order that he be committed to the department
for care and treatment until transferred to UDC in accordance with Sections 77-16a-203 and 77-16a-204; or
(b) sentence the offender to a term of imprisonment and order that he be committed to the department
for care and treatment for no more than 18 months, or until he has reached maximum benefit, whichever occurs first. At the expiration of that time, the court may recall the sentence and commitment, and resentence
the offender. A commitment and retention of jurisdiction under this subsection shall be specified in the sentencing order. If that specification is not included in the sentencing order, the offender shall be committed in
accordance with Subsection (a).
(2) The court may not retain jurisdiction, under Subsection (l)(b), over the sentence of a mentally ill offender who has been convicted of a capital offense. In capital cases, the court shall make the findings required by this section after the capital sentencing proceeding mandated by Section 76-3-207.
(3) When an offender is committed to the department under Subsection (l)(b), the department shall provide the court with reports of the offender's mental health status every six months. Those reports shall be
prepared in accordance with the requirements of Section 77-16a-203. Additionally, the court may appoint an
independent examiner to assess the mental health status of the offender.
(4) The period of commitment may not exceed the maximum sentence imposed by the court. Upon expiration of that sentence, the administrator of the facility where the offender is located may initiate civil proceedings for involuntary commitment in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 12 or Title 62A, Chapter 5.
HISTORY: C. 1953, 77-16a-202, enacted by L. 1992, ch. 171, § 6.
NOTES: EFFECTIVE DATES. -Laws 1992, ch. 171, § 18 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992.
USER NOTE: For more generally applicable notes, see notes under the first section of this article, part, chapter, subtitle, or title.
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TITLE 77. UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CHAPTER 16a. COMMITMENT AND TREATMENT OF MENTALLY ILL PERSONS
PART 2. DISPOSITION OF DEFENDANTS FOUND GUILTY AND MENTALLY ELL
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-203 (1994)

§ 77-16a-203. Review of guilty and mentally ill persons committed to department - Recommendations for
transfer

(1) The executive director shall designate a review team of at least three qualified staff members, including
at least one licensed psychiatrist, to evaluate the mental condition of each mentally ill offender committed to
it in accordance with Section 77-16a-202, at least once every six months. If the offender is mentally retarded,
the review team shall include at least one individual who is a designated mental retardation professional, as
defined in Section 62A-5-301.
(2) At the conclusion of its evaluation, the review team described in Subsection (1) shall make a report to
the executive director regarding the offender's current mental condition, his progress since commitment,
prognosis, and a recommendation regarding whether the mentally ill offender should be transferred to UDC
or remain in the custody of the department.
(3) (a) The executive director shall notify the UDC medical administrator, and the board's mental health
adviser that a mentally ill offender is eligible for transfer to UDC if the review team finds that the offender:
(i) is no longer mentally ill; or
(ii) is still mentally ill and continues to be a danger to himself or others, but can be controlled if adequate care, medication, and treatment are provided, and that he has reached maximum benefit from the programs within the department.
(b) The administrator of the mental health facility where the offender is located shall provide the UDC
medical administrator with a copy of the reviewing staffs recommendation and:
(i) all available clinical facts;
(ii) the diagnosis;
(iii) the course of treatment received at the mental health facility;
(iv) the prognosis for remission of symptoms;
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(v) the potential for recidivism;
(vi) an estimation of the offender's dangerousness, either to himself or others; and
(vii) recommendations for future treatment.
HISTORY: C. 1953, 77-16a-203, enacted by L. 1992, ch. 171, § 7.
NOTES: EFFECTIVE DATES. -Laws 1992, ch. 171, § 18 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992.
USER NOTE: For more generally applicable notes, see notes under the first section of this article, part, chapter, subtitle, or title.
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TITLE 77. UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CHAPTER 16a. COMMITMENT AND TREATMENT OF MENTALLY ILL PERSONS
PART 2. DISPOSITION OF DEFENDANTS FOUND GUILTY AND MENTALLY ILL
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-204 (1994)
§ 77-16a-204. Guilty and mentally ill — UDC acceptance of transfer

(1) The UDC medical administrator shall designate a transfer team of at least three qualified staff members,
including at least one licensed psychiatrist, to evaluate the recommendation made by the department's review
team pursuant to Section 77-16a-203. If the offender is mentally retarded, the transfer team shall include at
least one person who has expertise in testing and diagnosis of mentally retarded individuals.
(2) The transfer team shall concur in the recommendation if it determines that UDC can provide the mentally ill offender with the level of care necessary to maintain his mental condition.
(3) The UDC transfer team and medical administrator shall recommend the facility in which the offender
should be placed and the treatment to be provided in order for his mental condition to remain stabilized to the
director of the Division of Institutional Operations, within the Department of Corrections.
(4) In the event that the department and UDC do not agree on the transfer of a mentally ill offender, the
administrator of the mental health facility where the offender is located shall notify the mental health adviser
for the board, in writing, of the dispute. The mental health adviser shall be provided with copies of all reports
and recommendations. The board's mental health adviser shall make a recommendation to the board on the
transfer and the board shall issue its decision within 30 days.
(5) UDC shall notify the board whenever a mentally ill offender is transferred from the department to
UDC.
HISTORY: C. 1953, 77-16a-204, enacted by L. 1992, ch. 171, § 8.
NOTES: EFFECTIVE DATES. -Laws 1992, ch. 171, § 18 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992.
USER NOTE: For more generally applicable notes, see notes under the first section of this article, part, chapter, subtitle, or title.
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TITLE 77. UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CHAPTER 16a. COMMITMENT AND TREATMENT OF MENTALLY ILL PERSONS
PART 2. DISPOSITION OF DEFENDANTS FOUND GUILTY AND MENTALLY ILL
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-205 (1994)
§ 77-16a-205. Guilty and mentally ill -- Parole
(1) When a mentally ill offender who has been committed to the department becomes eligible to be considered for parole, the board shall request a recommendation from the executive director and from UDC before
placing the offender on parole.
(2) Before setting a parole date, the board shall request that its mental health adviser prepare a report regarding the mentally ill offender, including:
(a) all available clinical facts;
(b) the diagnosis;
(c) the course of treatment received at the mental health facility;
(d) the prognosis for remission of symptoms;
(e) potential for recidivism;
(f) an estimation of the mentally ill offenders dangerousness either to himself or others; and
(g) recommendations for future treatment.
(3) Based on the report described in Subsection (2), the board may place the mentally ill offender on parole. The board may require mental health treatment as a condition of parole. If treatment is ordered, failure
to continue treatment, except by agreement with the treatment provider, and the board, is a basis for initiation
of parole violation hearings by the board.
(4) UDC, through Adult Probation and Parole, shall monitor the status of a mentally ill offender who has
been placed on parole. UDC may provide treatment by contracting with the department, a local mental health
authority, any other public or private provider, or in-house staff.
(5) The period of parole may be no less than five years, or until expiration of the defendant's sentence,
whichever occurs first. The board may not subsequently reduce the period of parole without considering an
updated report on the offender's current mental condition.
HISTORY: C. 1953, 77-16a-205, enacted by L. 1992, ch. 171, § 9.
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NOTES: EFFECTIVE DATES. -Laws 1992, ch. 171, § 18 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992.
USER NOTE: For more generally applicable notes, see notes under the first section of this article, part, chapter, subtitle, or title.
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HB418
Representative Efforts for the consideration. [Inaudible] Clerk.
Frandsen
Parts of 418. Commitment and treatment of mentally ill persons in the criminal
Clerk
[ justice system by Lloyd W. Frandsen, Education 990 [inaudible] 7 absent.
Representative Frandsen
Unidentified
Representative
Representative Thank you Mrs. Speaker and fellow representatives. Also 418 is a cooperative
effort involving the body, different government agencies over a 6 month period
Frandsen
wherein they have tried to determine what would be a good process for
maximizing the treatment potential for mentally ill offenders.
A number of the agencies involved include Human Services, the Department of
Corrections, the Board of Pardons, the Psychiatric Secure Review Board.
Incidentally, that is a Board that we are abolishing under this particular piece of
legislation. And they are proposing to that by having the Court be given the
authority to impose a split sentence wherein a judge can detain a mentally ill
offender to the State hospital for treatment for up to 18 months and then modify
sentences based on the results of the treatment. Now also, the Department of
Corrections and the Department of Human Services can create teams of
professionals who understand the problems of these offenders to evaluate them
and then make recommendations as to appropriate disposition. Now we're also
fixing a great deal of responsibility here with the Board of Pardon.
In doing so, we are providing them with some expertise. That is they are given
the mental health advisor to better inform them about the needs of the mentally
ill. Now as I indicated, we are also doing, they have studied it, and this is one
thing that's kind of exciting. We can't say the government always perpetuates
itself forever. Here we have an example of where government has determined a
better way to handle a problem and they are abolishing the Psychiatric Services
Review Board. And I think that it's in the best interest of government that they
do so. It's in the best interest of these patients who are deemed to be mentally
ill offenders and individuals that are found not guilty by reason of insanity.
That's an awkward group to work with.
And so if there's any questions, I'd be happy to respond. But that's in essence
what this bill is doing. I understand there's a lot of underlying language you
.' will see in this bill and in essence, it makes a little complex. That is in part due
j to the fact that a lot of the law is being repealed and being reenacted. Again, if
j Jthere any questions JPd^beJiappy to respond.
Unidentified ! For the discussion, Representative Adams to the bill. Representative
Representative j LeBaron(sp??).
Representative With this sponsor you'll Frandsen
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Representative You will proceed?
Unidentified
Representative Franson appreciates the bill that you have. But I do have - 1
Representative have a question. The offender that you are talking about, a mentally disabled
as a mentally disabled person.
Representative That's correct.
Frandsen
Unidentified
What kind of offenses has he created?
Representative
Representative Well
Frandsen
J Unidentified
Can he be a murderer?
j Representative
Representative It would be a criminal offense of variety Frandsen
Unidentified
So he could be anything from murder to rape to child abuse to all kinds of
Representative things Representative That's right.
Frandsen
Unidentified
- that are bad.
Representative
Representative That's right.
Frandsen
Unidentified • And so your bill would allow him to be sent to the state mental which is in
Representative I Provo? That correct?
Representative j Yes.
Frandsen
J
j Unidentified
And hopefully they could deal with him down there.
i Representative
(Representative That's no different than the way it is currently.
Frandsen
Unidentified
I know. And that's why I'm concerned about it. Because the Court has been
Representative sending some of these people, these disabled offenders as we call them now, to
the hospital and has been sending them to the American Fort Training School.
And these people are so dangerous. And the security of these two places is not
adequate. We've had some mistakes and we've had some poor people being
injured. And one of the concerns that I have in addition to that is that the point
in their processing at this time, there's not even an outstanding conviction
against them. They've been sent down for evaluation and training - or
treatment. And it sounds like your bill will send some more down. We've got
them there now, they're just being warehoused. These treatments are not being
applied to, it is my information. And they won't be until we build a forensic
unit which we just now have approved some planning money for to be in the
[inaudible] security area. I am concerned how we're going to handle these.
Can you tell me?
[Inaudible - very, very low voice - not able to hear her at all]
Unidentified
Representative
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I'm plain sick of the bill. You'll note that we are giving the directors some
Unidentified
Representative authority to have some input as to who gets admitted into the State Hospital.
We've already had that. It doesn't work. I've sponsored a bill to get that in a
year ago and the legal society, I don't want to name names, has gotten around
that very easily and they're still sending them down despite that.
Representative All as I can indicate that it's never been as clear as what is being outlined in the
present piece of legislation. We've really clarified that. I don't know that we
Frandsen
have a perfect solution to your problem. I think that part of what you are
talking about goes beyond the purview of this particular piece of legislation.
While there's aspects of what your concern is that are being addressed here
inasmuch as, for example, we are providing the Board of Pardons with
expertise. We are fixing responsibility directly with them, giving them
expertise to deal with mental health offenders and relying upon the staff at the
State Hospital in connection with the corrections system to make a
determination as to whether or not somebody ought to appropriately be housed
at the State Hospital or in a correction facility. I think you can argue that these
are aspects of this particular piece of legislation. And I don't know how to go
beyond that.
Unidentified
Well I will support that part of it. That doesn't bother me at all if we can help
Representative them. The thing that is troubling me is it sounds like this will enable more
people of this type to be sent down to those institutions and they're not prepared
to hold them or treat them. They're too dangerous. The faculty cannot in safety
deal with some of these people. If we are going to send some more down there,
it makes the problem even worse. I would rather wait a bit until we get the
facility built where we can treat them and analyze them and do so in safety to
those who are trying to work with them as well as to the community where they
reside. It would make me feel better so I can vote.
Representative Well, the one thing that might help you solve a little better also, is that the
Frandsen
Court can place - the Court has to make a determination whether they are going
to the State Hospital or in a correction facility. If they determine that it's not
appropriate for them to be in a State Hospital, then they can be put in a
Correction FaciUty^
__
_ „
Unidentified
I wouldn't make it any easier for the Court to send these down Representative
Representative Representative, excuse me. I have a Point of Order. Representative Howard
Frandsen
state your point _ _
; Representative I believe we've exceed our time limit. If we wish to continue, I think we need a
Motion to Extend for some limited amount of time.
I Howard:
j Representative That would be correct Representative.
! Frandsen
[Inaudible],
j Unidentified
j Representative
I Representative ; See no further lights back [inaudible] Representative [inaudible] and for
I summation.
'. Frandsen

i
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Unidentified j Thank you. Mr. Speaker and fellow representatives, this bill is one of those
Representative I bills that has some high priority with the Executive Branch. It's one that we
need to address. Bear in mind that probably 8 different agencies - government
agencies have gotten together to determine how best to resolve this problem. It
| is not an easy thing to deal with. I regret that the bill is not a little more simple
j than what you would see, but I, I am very comfortable with the administrative
| process that is being outlined in this bill. We are clarifying. We're making a
| lot better for - easier for us to deal with these type of offenders and I think that
I it's one that's worthy of your consideration and would ask for your support.
[ Thank you.
Unidentified I Boarding is now open on House Bill Representative 1
^CORDING STOPS
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